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1. Introduction 
A prevalent theme in the literature on the economic impacts associated with defense 
expenditures strei,:;ses the detrimental effects on capital formation. Oeger1 has suggested 
that capital formation in the developing countries may be constrained not only or necessarily 
by a shortfall in savings due to high military spending but (perhaps more importantly) by a 
reduction in absorptive capacity to utilize the available savings as a result of the hypoth-
esized unfavorable impact of milit;:i.ry spending on public funding for human resources.2 
While Deger presents some empirical evidence based on a large sample of developing to 
support this view, the limitations inherent cross section analysis prevent us from drawing 
any broad generalizations as to the nature of the defense/savings relationship. In fact one 
could logically argue that military expenditure might force governments to increase 
taxation and domestic saving, part of which can be used for capital formation; it might foster 
human capital by training and modernizing people; it may create effective demand and 
reduce excess capacity. 
Ultimately whether or not defense expenditures reduce or increase (or are neutral) 
domestic savings can only be resolved through empirical testing. The purpose of this 
paper is to assess the links between defense expenditures and savings in Pakistan. In this 
regard, Pakistan serves as an ideal Cqse study because of the availability of extensive data 
on the country's savings rates. Have defense expenditures reduced that country's already 
low savings rates? Is the impact of defense expenditures on savings different than that 
of other types of government expenditures and if so what manner? 
2. Patterns of Defense Expenditures and Savings 
Pakistan's savings efforts are low by developing country standards. In fact, saving as a 
fraction of the Gross National Product (GNP) is one of the lowest among the developing 
countries. The current saving rate of about 14 percent of GNP fares badly with 23 percent 
for other low income developing countries.3 
1. See Saadat Deger, Military Expenditures in Third World Countries: The Economic Effects (London: Routledge 
· & Kagan Paul, 1986). 
2. Steve Chan, "Defense, Welfare, and Growth: Introduction" in Steve Chan and Alex Mintz, Defense, Welfare and 
Growth: Perspectives and Evidence (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 4-5. 
3. Several good comparative studies exist. See for example: Maxwell J. Fry, "Saving, Financial Intermediation and 
Economic Growth in Asia" Asian Development Review, vol 2, no. 1 (1984), pp. 82-91; Maxwell Fry "Domestic 
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A brief examination of the patterns of savings and public expenditures in Pakistan (Table 
1) does not suggest that (at least since 1973) defense expenditures have played a major 
role in lowering the country's domestic resources: 
i. Defense expenditures appear to have stabilized at around 7 percent of gross domestic 
product, whereas non-military expenditures increased from 9.6 percent of GDP in 1973 to 
17.8 percent in 1989. 
Table 1 
Pakistan: ~attems of Savings and Government Expenditures, 1973-1991 
(percentage' of Gross Domestic Product) 
Year Savings Expenditures 
Private Public Gross Gross Miiitary Non-
Domestic National Military 
1973 11.26 -0.46 13.47 10.79 7.02 9.62 
1974 7.27 -0.15 9.63 7.12 6.83 9.89 
1975 6.56 -0.14 7.37 5.99 6.75 10.81 
1976 9.45 0.81 10.79 10.26 6.22 10.95 
19n 8.90 2.45 -22.63 11.36 6.04 10.36 
1978 12.67 1.80 8.81 14.48 5.82 11.64 
1979 11.17 1.07 7.12 12.24 6.20 12.39 
1980 11.49 2.20 7.79 13.69 6.23 11.31 
1981 10.97 4.16 9.26 15.12 6.37 12.82 
1982 10.95 3.32 8.32 14.27 6.98 10.09 
1983 15.73 1.27 8.46 17.00 7.39 11.98 
1984 13.03 2.02 7.70 15.06 7.31 12.37 
1985 12.55 0.38 6.28 12.93 7.43 12.39 
1986 13.18 1.71 10.95 14.89 7.55 13.49 
1987 16.48 0.49 13.86 16.98 7.68 13.95 
1988 12.30 1.33 12.45 13.63 7.20 16.22 
1989 13.87 0.21 12.63 14.08 7.08 17.80 
1990 12.32 1.n 13.23 14.09 7.14 16.08 
1991 12.01 1.99 14.55 13.99 6.85 15.~ 
Source: World Bank 
Resource Mobilization in Developing Aria: Four Policy Issues Asian Development Review, vol. 9, no 1 (1991 ), pp. 
15-39; and Graham J. Abbott, "National Saving and financial Development in Asian Developing Countries" Asian 
Development Review, vol 2 no. 2 (1984), pp. 1-22. 
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ii. At the same time the country's gross national saving rate has shown considerable 
fluctuations with public savings particularly low. 
iii. Private savings has also fluctuated over a fairly wide range, from a low of 6.56 percent 
in 1975 to 16.48 percent in 1987. 
These patterns suggest that defense expenditures are probably not the major cause of the 
country's low savings rate. However within the overall context of the domestic economy, 
defense expenditures may well compound the country's problems at resource mobilization. 
There are two major explanations for the country's low savings efforts4 : (a) the financial 
repressionist5 and (b) the financial structuralist. The former school led by McKinnon6 argue 
that the low (or negative real interest rates caused by arbitrarily set ceilings on nominal 
interest rates and high and variable inflation rates are the major impediments to savings, 
financial depending, capital formation and growth. The solution therefore lied in freeing the 
interest rates to find their equilibrium levels in a free market environment. . 
The financial structuralist school is led by Godsmith7 attributes the low savings, investment 
and growth in developing countries to the relatively less developed financial structures in 
terms of financial assets, institutions, and markets. He notes that a widespread network 
of financial institutions and diversified array of financial instruments will have a beneficial 
effect on the saving-investment process and hance,.on growth. 
With respect to Pakistan only Abe8 and Qureshi9 have tested empirically the McKinnon-
Shaw. model and found that financial repression holds domestic saving below the level 
which would occur under a policy of financial liberalization.10 In his study Khan found that: 11 
4. Ashfaque H. Khan "Financial Repression, Financial Development and Structure of Savings in Pakistan" The 
Pakistan Development Review, vol XXVll, no. 4 Part II (Winter 1988), pp. 701-711. 
5. Financial repression has been generally identified with "low nominal interest rates and high and variable rates of 
inflation, or alternatively with the existence of negative real rates of interest. 
6. Ronald McKinnon, Money and Capital in Economic Development (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 
1973); and Ronald McKinnon, Money and Finance in Economic Growth (New York; Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1976). 
7. R.W., Goldsmith, Financial Structure and Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969). 
8. S. Abe, M.J. Fry, B. K. Min, P. Vongipanond and T. Yu "Financial Liberalization and Domestic Saving in Economic 
Development: An Empirical Test for Six Countries" Pakistan Development Review, vol XVI, no. 3 (1977). 
9. Zia M. Qureshi, "Household Saving in Pakistan: Some Finding's from Time Series Data" Pakistan Development 
Review, vol XX, No. 4 (1981). · 
10. Khan, op. cit .. p. 702. 
11. Khan, op. cit .. p. 709. 
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1. A significant and positive association exists between the real rate of return on. deposit 
,and aggregate savings. The interest elasticity of nationa! savings ranges from 0.01 to 0.03 
depending upon the choice of sample size. 
2. The aggregate real income (measured or permanent) is also found to be a key 
determinant of national, financial and physical savings. The marginal propensity to save 
(MPS) out of real income under various expectation schemes for the three types of saving 
functions range from 0.06 to 0.21. 
3. Financial development measured by the financial intermediation ratio is also found to 
have significant positive influence on the national and financial savings while negative 
influence of physical savings. Thus the viewpoints of two school schools of thought, 
namely "financial repressionist" and Financial structuralist" are fully supported in the case 
of Pakistan. 
4. Beside real income (measured or permanent) and real return on deposits there are other 
factors such as unanticipated inflation and variability of inflation which are found to have 
a significant impact on these saving funcitons. · 
In short Khan's findings clearly point out the existence of financial repression on the one 
hand and lack of financial development on the other hand in Pakistan. The solution, 
therefore, lies in freeing the return on deposits to find their equilibrium levels in a free-
market environment. In particular the authorities should strive to make the real return on 
deposits positive either by increasing the nominal return or by reducing inflation. Further-
more, a widespread network of financial institutions and a diversified array of financial 
instruments will increase savings in Pakistan.12 
\ 
3. Defense Expenditures and Resource Availability 
Given these environmental conditions, at the aggregate level there are three channels 
through which military spending can affect growth. The resource allocation effect transfers 
potential investment resources to the military, reducing investment and growth.13 The 
12. Khan, op. cit., p. 709. 
13. Saadat Dager and Somnath Sen, "Military Expenditure, Aid and Economic Development" Proceedings of the 
World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, 1991 (supplement to the World Bank Economic 
Review and the World Bank Research Observer (1992), p .. 161-162. 
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resource allocation effecttransfers potential investment resources to the military, reducing 
investment and growth. The resource mobilization effect shows that defense spending 
could reduce the national savings ration. The household savings ratio falls because 
expenditure rises as public services are cut back to finance military expansion, the 
government saving ratio may decline if the additional defense spending is not compen-
sated by higher tax revenues, and foreign savings are dissipated through arms imports. 
Finally in countries with human capital constraints an e~pansion of military personnel and 
industrial systems will worsen absorptive capacity. 
Since the modern defense establishment is a heavy consumer of technical and managerial 
manpower and foreign exchange, resources that are especially scare in the Third World 
the conventional wisdom14 is that increased defense burdens should reduce the overall 
rate of growth15• 
The issue of defense expenditures and savings/investment was initially examined by 
Smith15.ln this study Smith assumed that resources devoted to military purposes can be 
extracted from economic growth or by diverting resources from consumption and/or 
investment. Which tradeoffs are pursued is a function of the nature of the state in question. 
Advanced capitalist states, Smith argues are not likely to interfere with private consump-
tion or the welfare component of public consumption. Such interference would be to 
unpopular and politically costly. Increases in military spending are thus likely to occur at 
the expense of investment. 
This intuitive notion was first empirically challenged by Emile Benoit17 in what is often 
referred to as the Modernization Model. What acknowledging that defense spending 
necessarily reduces domestic civilian production, and crowds out civilian investment, 
Benoit contended that these unfavorable effects are apt to be offset by the other more 
positive effects in developing countries. In particular, Benoit suggested that defense 
14. This survey of the literature draws heavily on Steve Chan "Defense Welfare and Growth: Introduction" in Steve 
Chan and Alex Mintz eds., Defense, Welfare and Growth: Perspectives and Evidence (London: Routledge, 1992), 
pp. 1-20. . 
15. For an overview of this argument see Saadat Dager and Robert West, "Introduction: Defense Expenditures, 
National Security and Economic Development in the Third World" in Saadat Dager and Robert West eds., Defense, 
Security and Development (London: Francis Pinter, 1987), pp. 1-16. 
16. Ron P. Smith, "Military Expenditures and Capitalism" Cambridge Journal of Economics (1977), pp. 61-76. 
17. See in particular: Emile Benoit, Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries(Lexington, Mass: D.C. 
Heath, 1973); and Emile Benoit, "Growth and Defense in Developing Countries" Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, vol. 26 (1978), pp. 271-80. 
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spending and military service in modern skills and attitudes, help to develpp basic 
economic infrastructure, and produce mild inflation which in turn encourages fuller 
utilization of the existing production facilities. In a variant ~f this model, Charles Wolf18 
notes that by creating a more stable environment it was very possible in certain cases or 
situations for added defense expenditures to stimulate higher rates of investment, 
technological progress, technolpgy transfer ana hence increased overall growth. 
In defense of Benoit, Babin 19 and Kick and Sharda20 have found respectively that military 
spending and personnel tended to contribute to faster economic growth in the relatively 
long term-ten or twelve years. Stewart21 looking at a sample of African and Latin American 
countries found no evidence to support the association of higer defense burdens with 
slower economic growth. Instead it appears that a larger defense burden is stimulative and 
in fact, is more stimulative than a larger non defense burden. 
Several other analysts-Dixon and Moon22 have also presented findings indicating that 
large armed forces (as distinct from large military budgets) seem to be conducive to the 
development and formation of human capital. 
As might be expected this topic has become quite controversial and if sheer numbers of 
papers23 alone mean anything a good case could be made that defense expenditures are 
. likely to be detrimental to the economic halth ·of Third World countries. 
18. Charles Wolf "Economic Success, Stability and Old International Order" International Security (1981 ), pp. 75-
92. 
19. Nehama Babin, "Military Spending, Economic Growth and the Time Factor'' Armed Forces and Society vol. 15, 
(1989), pp, 249-62. 
20. Edward Kick and Ban Dev Sharda, "Third World Militarization and Development" Journal of Developing Societies 
vol. 2 (1986), pp. 49-67. 
21. Douglas B. Stewart "Economic Growth and the Defense Burden in Africa and Latin America: Simulations from 
a Dynamic Model" Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 40, no. 1 (October 1991 ), pp. 199-200. 
22. William Dixon and Bruce E.Moon, "The Military Burden and Basic Human Needs" Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
vol. 30 (1986), pp, 660-84. 
23. See for example: Nicole Ball "Defense and Development: A Critique of the Benoit Study" in Helena Tuomi and 
Raimo Vayrynen eds., Militarization and Arms Production (New York: St. Martin's, 1983), pp. 39-56; B. Biswas.and 
Rati Ram, "Military Expenditures and Economic Growth in Less Developed Countries" Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, vol. 34 (1986), pp. 361-72; Saade! Deger, Military Expenditure in Third World Countries: The 
Economic Effects (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986); Saade! Deger and Ron Smith "Military Expenditure and 
Growth in Less Developed Countries" Journal of Conflict Resolution,vol. 27 (1093), pp. 67-83; Ricardo Faini, 
Patricia Arnez and Lance Taylor "Defense Spending, Economic Structure and Growth: Evidence Among Countries 
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As Chan notes24 one of the more powerful criticisms directed against the original Benoit 
studies is that they gave too much emphasis to the positive effects of defense spending 
in mobilizing the available national resources and in instilling modern skills and attitudes 
in the developing world, and that he did not give enough emphasis to the negative effects 
of defense spending on savings and investment. This capital formation model stresses 
private investment as the kay determinant of economic growth. Here there is some 
evidence25 that the negative effect of military expenditures on saving (and investment) 
outweighs the positive modernization and technological effect on the growth rate. While 
this problem may be more prevalent in the industrialized economies, the existence of such 
a tradeoff has been also observed in the developing world. 26 Country studies have not 
·provided conclusive evidence of a defense investment tradeoff however. In particular 
studies of lndia27 and the Middle Eastern28 nations were unable to establish any statistically 
significant tradeoff between defense spending and civilian investment. For the Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, Syria and Israel it appears that in a dynamic context defense expenditures 
have not been ad odds with acceptable economic performance29• 
and Over Time" Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol 32 (1984), pp. 487-98; James H. Lebovic and 
Ashfaq lshaq "Military Burden, Security Needs, and Economic Growth in the Middle East" Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, vol. 31 (1987), pp. 106-138; Lisa Grobar and Richard C. Porter "Benoit Revisited: Defense Spending 
and Economic Growth in L[)Cs" Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 33 (1989), pp. 318-45; David Lim "Another Look 
at Growth and Defense in Less Developed Countries" Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 31 (1983), 
pp. 377-84. 
24. Steve Chan "Defense Welfare and Growth: Introduction" in Steve Chan and Alex Mintz eds., Defense, Welfare 
and Growth: Perspectives and Evidence (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 3-4. 
25. Saad et Deger and Ron Smith "Military Expenditure and Growth in Less Developed Countries" Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, vol 27 (1083), pp. 335-53; Ron Smith, "Military Expenditure and Capitalism" Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, vol 1 (1977), pp. 61-76; and Ron Smith "Military Expenditure and Investment in OECD Countries• 
Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 4, pp. 19-32. 
26. Adne Cappelen, Nils P. Gleditsch and Olav Bjerkholt "Military Spending and Economic Growth in the OECD 
Countries" Journal of Peace Research, vol. 21 (1984), pp. 361-74; and Saade! Deger Military Expenditure in Third 
World Countries: The Economic Effects (London: Ro.utledge & Kegan Paul, 1986). 
27. Michael D. Ward et. al., "Economic Growth, Investment and Military Spending in India, 1950-1988" in Steve Chan 
and Alex Mintz, Defense, Welfare and Growth: Perspectives and Evidence (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 119-136. 
28. Robert E. Looney, "The Economics of Middle Eastern Military Expenditures: Implications for Arms Reduction 
in the Region" Bulletin of Peace Proposals, vol. 22, no. 4(December1991 ), pp. 407-418; and James H. Levovic and 
Ashfaq lshaq "Military Burden, Security Deeds and Economic Growth in the Middle East" Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, vol. 31 (1987), pp. 106-38. 
29. Robert E. Looney, "The Economics of Middle Eastern Military Expenditures: Implications for Arms Reduction 
in the Region" Bulletin of Peace Proposals, vol 22, no. 4(December1991), p. 415. 
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"In fact defense expenditures appear to have produced a greater stimulus to investment 
than that offered by other types of government expenditures. Regarding shorter-run 
budgetary trade-offs, there do not appear to be any strongly negative associations between 
defense and growth-enhancing expenditures such as economic services or education. 
Ultimately, however the generally positive impact of defense on investment much account 
for the counter-intuitive finding that defense-and growth are positively linked." 
Unfortunately many of these studies are inconclusive because the important question of 
causation was not resolved. In particular do military expenditures affect savings/invest-
ment as is usually assumed or in fact do military expenditures simply reflect changing 
macroeconomic conditions?. Stressing the issue of causation a recent study by Ras I er and 
Thompson30 attempt.to determine if defense expenditures caused the relative decline of 
the En,glish economy. Using several causality tests, they find that in the nineteenth 
century, military spending increased (decreased) when nonmilitary public consumption 
increased (decreased). Major changes in military spending though impact negatively on 
non-military public consumption. In late twentieth century Britain, however, non-military 
public consumption positively occurs before military spending. Evidence for a tradeoff 
relationship is no longer apparent. 
Their analysis suggests that prior to World War I investment influenced consumption 
opportunities. After world War II the picture becomes more complicated. After 1950 
economic growth negatively impacts on military spending and private.consumption and 
positively antecedes nonmilitary public consumption. Similarly, investment negatively 
antecedes military spending and positively antecedes nonmilitary public consumption. 
From this they conclude that.31 
· "it may also be fair to say that post-1950 military spending as become increasingly 
subordinated in comparison to the pre-1913 situation .... Rising demands in the context of 
insufficient resources due in considerable part fo a century of relative decline are 
responsible for the nature of consumption-investment squeezes and other policy prob-
lems in post-world War II Britain's political economy." 
30. Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson "Political-Economic Tradeoffs and British Relative Decline" in Steve 
Chan and Alex Mintz, eds., Defense, Welfare and Growth: Perspectives and Evidence (London: Routledge, 1992), 
pp. 36-60. 






R. E. LOONEY· DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND SAVINGS IN PAKISTAN 
While Rasler and Thompson's results are controversial, their study does demonstrate that 
the only way to resolve the debate over defense and savings/investment is through time 
series causality analysis. This is the approach adopted below in our examination of the 
Pakistani situation. 
4. Alternative Tests for Causation 
Several statistical tests are available for addressing the issue at hand. To date, the original 
and most widely used has been the Granger32 Test. 
Granger Test 
Granger defines causality such that X Granger causes (G-C) Y if Y can be predicted more 
accurately in the sense of mean square error, with the use of past values of X than without 
using past X. For example, in assessing the relationship between defense and savings 
performance, Granger causality can be specified as: 
p q 
(1 )SAV(t) = c + SUM a(i)SAV(t-i) + SUM bU)DEFt-j + u(t) 
i=1 i=1 
r s 
(2) DEF(t) = c + SUM d(i) DEF(t-1) + SUM eU)SAV(t-j) + v(t) 
. i=1 j=1 
where SAV is a measure of the country's savings effort and DEF= defense expenditures, 
p,q; rand s are lag lengths for each variable in the equation; and u and v are serially 
uncorrelated white noise residuals. By assuming that error terms (u, v) are "nice" the 
specified model is estimated by the ordinary least squares (OLS) method33• 
Within the framework of unrestricted and restricted models, a joint F-lest is commonly used 
for causal detection. The F-statistic would be calculated by: 
32. C.W.J. Grander, "Investigating Casual Relations by Econometric Models and Cross-Spectral Methods," 
Econometrica (1969), pp. 424-438. 
33. If the disturbances of the model were serially correlated, the OLS estimates would be inefficient, although still 
unbiased, and would distort the causal relations. The existence of serial correlation was checked by using a 
maximum likelihood correlation for the first-order autocorrelation of the residuals [AR(1 }). The comparison of both 
OLS and AR(1} results indicated that no significant changes appeared in causal directions. Therefore, we can 
conclude "roughly" that serial correlation was not serious in this model. 
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(RSS(x) - RSS(u)/(df(x) - df(u) 
(3) F =---------
RSS(u)/df(u) 
where RSS(r) and RSS(u) are the residual sam of squares of restricted and unrestricted 
models, respectively; and df(r) and df(u) are, respectively, the degress of freedom in 
restricted and unrestricted models. 
The Granger test detects causal directions in the following manner. First, unidirectional 
causality from DEF to SAV if the F-test rejects the null hypothesis than past values of DEF 
in equation (1) are insignificantly different from zero and if the F-Test cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that past values of SAV in equation (2) are insignificantly different from zero. 
That is, DEF causes SAV but SAV does not cause DEF. Unidirectional causality runs from 
SAV to EXP if the reverse is true. Second, bidirectional causality runs between DEF and 
SAV if both F-test statistics reject the null hypotheses in equations (1) and (2). Finally, no 
causality exists between· DEF and SAV if both null hypotheses cannot be rejected at the 
conventional significance level. 
In a related study Joerding34 has tested the relationship between defense and growth 
hypothesis using Granger yausality methods. That is he tested for the assumed exogenetty 
of defense budgets. Using a pooled sample containing 15 observations from each of 57 
countries, Joerding employed a multivariate model which also included investment and 
government spending and concluded thatdefense expenditures are not strongly exogenous 
and that previous studies were flawed. 
While Joerding's work provides insight into the nature of the relationship between defense 
and growth, there are three issues that merit further attention: 
1. Joerding lumps all countries into one sample. This suggests that any causal relationship 
which is found is assumed common to all countries. As was shown by Frederiksen and 
Looney35 in a review of Benoit's work, splitting a pooled sample into separate groups (in 
their case based on the level of relative resource constraints) can lead to quite different 
results. 
34. W. Joerding, "Economic Growth and Defense Spending; Granger Causality" Journal of Development Economics 
(1986), pp. 35-40. ' 
35. P .C. Frederiksen and Robert E. Looney "Defense Expenditures and Economic Growth in Developing Countries," 
Armed Forces and Society (1983), pp. 633-45. 
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2. By aggregating the sample, Jourging assumed a common lag structure for all of the 
countries in the sample (in his study, four years on the defense and growth variables). It 
seems reasonable to hypothesis if a causal relationship does exist (either defense to 
growth or growth to defense) we could expect the time lag to differ from country tb country. 
3. Joerging's method for choosing lag length was ad hoc. 
The results of Granger causality tests depend critically on the choice of lag length. If the 
chosen lag length is less than the true lag length, the omission of relevant lags can cause 
bias. If the chosen lag is greater than the true lag length, the inclusion of irrelevant lags 
cause estimates to be inefficient. 
While Joerding chose hiS lag lengths based on preliminary partial autocorrelation 
methods, there is no a priori reason to assume lag lengths equal for all of our sample 
countries. for example in a study of the Philippines, Frederiksen and LaCivita36 found no 
statistical relationship between growth and defense when both variables were entered in 
the estimating equation with a lag equal to four. When the lag length was changed to two 
periods, however, it was found that growth caused defense. Since both lag lengths were 
chosen arbitrarily, one cannot say whic~ is preferred. 
5. The Hsaio Procedure 
To overcome the difficulties noted above, Hsaio37 has developed a systematic method for 
choosing lag lengths for each variable in an equation. Hsiao'smethod combines Granger 
Causality and Akaike's final prediction error (FPE) defined as the (asymptotic) mean 
square prediction error, to determine both the optimum lag for each variable and causal 
relationships. In a paper examining the problems encountered in choosing lag lengths, 
Thornton and Batten38 found Hsiao's method to be superior to both arbitrary lag length 
selection and several other systematic procedures for determining lag length. 
36. P.C. Frederiksen and C.J LaCivita, "Defense Spending and Economic Growth: Time Series Evidence on Causality 
for the Philippines, 1956-1982," Journal of Philippine Development (Second Semester 1987), pop. 354-60. 
37. C. Hsiao, "Autoregressive Modeling and Money-Income Causality Detection", Journal of Monetary Economics 
(1981 ), pp. 8. . 
38. D.L. Thornton and D.S. Batten, "Lag-length Selection and Tests of Grander Causality Between Money and 
Income," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (1985), pp. 164-78. 
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The first step in Hsiao's procedure is to perform a series of autoregressive regressions on 
the dependent variable. In the first regression, the dependent variable is lagged once. In 
each succeeding regression, one more lag on the dependent variable is added. That is we 
estimate M regressions of the form: 
m 
(4) G{t) =a+ Sum b{t-1)G{t-1) + e{i) 
i=1. 
where the values of m range from 1 to M. For each regression, we compute the FPE in the 
following manner 
T+m+1 
(5) FPE(m) = ESS(m)/T . 
T-m-1 
Where: Tis the sample size, and FPE(m) and ESS(m) are the final prediction error and 
the sum of squared errors, respectively. The optimal lag length, m*, is the lag length which 
. produces the lowest FPE. Once has been determined, regressions are estimated with the 
lags on the other variable added sequentially in the same manner used to determine m*. 
Thus we estimate four regressions of the form: 
m* n 
(E;l) G(t) =a+ Sum b(t-1)G(t-1) +Sum c(t-1)D(t-1) + e(i) 
i=1 i=1 
with n ranging from one to four. Computing the final prediction error for each regression 
as: 
T+m*+n+1 
FPE(m*,n) = ESS(m*,n)/T 
T-m*-n-1 
we choose the optimal lag length for D, n* as the lag length which produces the lowest FPE. 
Using the final prediction error to determine lag length is equivalent to using a series of F 
tests with variable levels of significance39 • · 
39. Since the F statistic is redundant in this instance they are not reported here. They are, however,.available fc;irm 
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The first term measures the estimation error and the second term measures the modeling 
error. The FPE criterion has a certain optimality property that "balances the risk due to bias 
when a lower order is selected and the risk due to increases in the variance when a higher 
order is selected40• As noted by Judge41 an intuitive reason for using the FPE criterion is 
that longer lags increase the first term but decrease the RSS of the secon term, and thus 
the two opposing forces are balanced optimally when their product reaches its minimum. 
With regard to the defense/savings relationship, four cases are possible: (a) Defense 
causes Savings-occurring when the prediction error for savings is reduced when 
defense is added to the savings equation. In addition when savings is added to the defense 
equation, the final prediction error increases; (b) Savings causes Defense-occurring 
when the prediction error of savings increases when defense is added to the regression 
equation for savings, and is reduced when savings is added to the regression equation for 
defense; (c) Feedback-occurring when the final prediction error decreases when 
defense is added to the savings equation, and the final prediction error decreases when 
savings is added to the defense equation; and (d) No Relationship-occurs when the final 
prediction error increases when, defense is added to the savings equation, and also 
increases when savings is added to the defense equation. 
6. Methodology 
The data for military expenditures used to carry out the Haiso tests were compiled from 
the Stockholm International Peace Research lnstitute,42 SIPRI Yearbook, World Arma-
ments and Disarmament (New York: Oxford University Press, various issues). Annual 
data on various measures of savings was obtained from the yearly World Bank assess-
ment of Pakistan43 • The figures on GDP ·and the GDP price deflators are from the 
International Monetary Fund44• 
Before analy.sis was undertaken, several factors needed to be takeri into account. First, 
40. C. Hsiao, "Causality Tests in Econometric!l," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (1979), p. 326. 
41. G.G. Judge, W. Hill, H. Griffiths, H. Lutkephol, and T.C. Lee, Introduction to the Theory and Practice of 
Econometrics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1982). · 
42. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook, World Armaments and Disarmament(New 
York: Oxford University Press, various issues). 
43. See for example: World Bank, Pakistan: Country Economic Memorandum FY93, Progress under the Adjustment 
Program, Report No. 11590-PAK(Washington: IBRD, March 23, 1993). 
44 .. International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (Washington: International Monetary 
Fund), various issues. 
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it is widely known that most economic time series are non-stationary. As indicated by 
Judge, et.al45• "Stationary is an important property as it guarantees that there are no 
fundamental changes in the structure of the process that would render prediction difficult 
or impossible." In order to remove all possible non-stationarities, real defense expendi-
tures and real income variables were transformed to rates of growth. When these 
transformed series were regressed on a constant and time, their coefficients on time were 
insignificantly different from zero for all countries. Similar regressions of the untransformed 
levels indicated the presence of a trend. 
Seconc:j, because military expenditures may simply act as a proxy for government 
expenditures in general, separate regressions were performed using (when available) 
figures on total government expenditures and allocations to non-defense categories of the 
budget. If the results were significantly different using these other forms of public spending, 
we concluded that the defense/growth relationship was unique and not spurious. 
7. Results 
The results for the causality analysis of defense expenditures and savings are presented 
with the final prediction error (FPE), together the optimal lag. As a basis of comparison a 
similar analysis was undertaken for total government expenditures and the government's 
allocation to non-defense activities. Several interesting patterns emerged from this 
analysis. 
In terms of savings undertaken by the private sector46 (Table 2): 
1. In general, total expenditures on the part of the government reduces private savings. 
2. This impact is strong and occurs over a fairly long time frame-averaging three years for 
the growth in total government expenditures and four years for the growth in the share of 
government expenditures in GDP. 
3. In contrast defense expenditures impact positively on savings. That is increases in 
defense expenditure increase savings in subsequent tim~ periods. Again the lag is fairly 
long (four years) for the growth in defense expenditures. However increases in the defense 
45. G·.G. Judge, R.C. Hill, W. Griffiths, H. Lutkepohl and T.C. Lee, Introduction to the Theory and Practice of 
Econometrics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1982), p. 671. 
46. All of the findings summarized below are in the same form as Table_2. They could not be included because of 
space limitations. However, they are available from the author upon request. 
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exert a much weaker impact on savings, with the impact occurring after a year. 
4. Non-defense expenditures reflect the patterns associated with total expenditures: 
allocations to these categories reduce savings with an average lag of three years. The 
impact is somewhat stronger for the growth in expenditures (as opposed to the growth in 
the share of non-defense in GDP). 
Table2 
Pakistan: Interaction of Government Expenditures and Private Sector National Savings 1973-1991 
Causation Patterns Dominant 
Pattern 
Saving Saving Expend Expend 
Saving Expend Expend Saving 
Total Expenditures 
Optimal Lag (years) 2 3 2 1 Expend-> 
Final Prediction Error (460.16) (298.60). (li0.32) (92.97) Savings (-s) 
Total Expenditures Share of GDP 
Optimal Lag (years) 2 4 1 1 Expend-> 
Final Prediction Error (460.16) (290.58) (50.90) (52.60) Savings (-s) 
Defense Expenditures 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 4 1 1 Defense-> 
Final Prediction Error (460.16) (350.01) (26.79) (30.94) Savings (+m) 
Defense Burden 
Optimal Lag (years) 2 1 1 1 Defense 
Final Prediction Error (460.16) (433.27) (26.30) (30.49) Savings ( +w) 
Non-Defense Expenditures 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 3 1 1 Expend-> 
Final Prediction Error (460.16) (397.30) (159.87) (171.64) Savings (-s) 
Non-Defense Share of GDP 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 2 1 1 Expend-> 
Final Prediction Error (460.16) {422.61)· (130.22) (137:29) Savings (-m) 
Notes: Summary of results obtained from Granger Causality Tests. A Hsaio Procedure was incorporated to 
determine the optimal lag. All variables are in the from of growth rates. The dominant pattern is that with the lowest 
final prediction error. The signs(+,-) represent the direction of impact. In the case of feedback the signs refer to the 
second and fourth set of causation patterns (i.e., Defense/Revenues and Revenues/Defense). Each of the variables 
was regressed with 1, 2, 3, and 4 year lags. Strength assessment (s =strong; m = moderate; w =weak) based on 
the size of the standardized regression coefficient and ttest of statistical significance. Defense burdens are the share 
of defense expenditures in GDP. Defense expenditures are from: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
SIPRI Yearbook (New York: Oxford University Press), various issues. Economic data are from: International 
Monetary Fund, International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (Washington: Interna-
tional Monetary Fund), various issues. 
227 
SAVINGS AND DEVELOPMENT - No. 2 -1995 - XIX 
Keeping in mind the very low levels (as a share of GDP) the causatiOl'l analysis for this 
category of domestic resources provided several additional findings are of interest: 
1. In contrast to the patterns associated with private savings, total expenditures interact 
with public savings through a feedback relationship: increases in the growth of public 
expenditures and the growth in their share of GDP both have a moderately strong and 
positive impact on public savings. In return increased public savings has a weak negative 
impact on future public expenditures. · 
2. On the other hand, non defense expenditure so no statistically significant relationships 
vis a vie public savings. This holds for both the growth in defense expenditure and the 
growth in the defense burden (defense expenditures as a share of GDP). 
3. Finally non-defense expenditures exhibit a strong and positive impact on p\Jblic savings. 
This impact occurs on average over a period of two to three years. · 
These patterns of expenditures and public savings suggest that past public savings do not 
contribute to increased spending rates. Instead the government funds its expenditures 
largely out of current revenues and its borrowing program. The non-defense component 
of these exenditures may in turn stimulate the country's tax base to the extent that (again 
over a short time period) revenues out-run the government's ability to spend. 
Another contrasting pattern is associated with public expenditures and changes in the 
country's gross domestic savings. While there were no statistically significant links 
between expenditures and savings over the 1960-91 period, several links developed in the 
post-1973 period: 
1. Total public expenditures and the non-defense component of these expenditures do not 
interact with gross domestic savings in any statistically significant way. 
2. In contrast defense expenditures have a fairly strong impact on domestic savings. This 
impact occurs over a long period (averaging four years) and is similar for both the growth 
in defense expenditures and the growth in the defense burden. 
3. As with total expenditures, non-defense expenditures did not show any statistically 
significant linkages with .the c.ountry's overall rate of gross· domestic savings, 
The main difference between gross domestic savings and gross national savings in 
Pakistan is the remittances of foreign workers. Historically these inflows have resulted in 
a rate of gross national savings somewhat above that of gross domestic savings. Also 
228 
• 
R. E. LOONEY - DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND SAVINGS IN PAKISTAN 
since these inflows are largely exogenous (a function of oil revenues), their links with 
government expenditures should be more tenuous than in tl")e case of gross domestic 
savings. Given this situation, several patterns stand out: 
1. Total expenditures now impact negatively on savings, with increases in both the rate of 
growth in expenditures and the growth in the share of GDP reducing savings in the next 
year. This impact is however quite weak. 
2. In contrast increased savings tends to dampen increases in defense expenditures and 
the defense burden. Again this impact is quite weak and occurs a year following the change 
in expenditures. 
3. Finally non defense expenditures show no statistically significant linkage with savings. 
While these patterns suggest that total expenditures may crowd out a certain amount of 
savings, given the volatile nature of worker remittances and the fact that non-defense 
expenditures do not appear to impact on savings, one is probably safe in concluding that 
government expenditures are somewhat neutral with r~gard to gross national savings. 
Certainly in .terms of the current study there is now evidence that defense expenditures 
have an adverse effect on the country's national savings rate. 
Savings are a residual calculated after subtra9ting consumption from income. As noted 
earlier, the literature suggests that many governments may find it politically expedient to 
reduce investment rather than consumption during periods of expanded defense expen-
ditures. Again Smith's work suggests that this phenomenon is more likely to occur in 
democratically elected governments. 
For the period from 1960-91 however there are no clear patterns linking the various facets 
of government expenditure with private consumption. This changes however in the post 
1973 period where defense expenditures actually decrease private consumption. The 
impact is fairly strong and occurs with a lag of only one year. As with the post 1960 period 
as a whole however there is no statistically significant link between total government 
expenditures or non-defense expenditures and the growth in private consumption. 
8. Conclusions 
The main finding of this paper is that there is little evidence that military expenditures in 
Pakistan have preempted domestic savings from the private sector or that these expen-
ditures have reduced the country's rate of savings below its already low levels. Interest-
ingly defense expenditures do appear to impact on domestic savings in a manner quite 
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different from that of non-defense expenditures. In general, non-defense expenditures 
may1 in some instances, be a factor in retarding the mobilization of domestic resources. 
The fact that defense expenditures may come at the expense of private consumption 
further supports the conclusion that allocations to the military may not have the disruptive 
effect on long run growth often associated in other countries with this category of 
expenditures~ 
Abstract 
Recent academic literature on defense expenditures stresses a number of potential 
tradeoffs between allocations to the military and key macroeconomic aggregates. How-~ 
ever to date no systematic research'has been conducted on the links between defense 
expenditures and savings. Using Pakistan as a case study the analysis below examines 
whether defense expenditures have reduced that country's already low savings rates. 
Specifically: Is the impact of defense expenditures on savings different from that of other 
types of government expenditures and if so in what manner? 
The main finding of this paper is that there is little evidence that military expenditures in 
Pakistan have preempted domestic savings from the private sector or that these expen-
ditures have reduced the country's rate of savings below its already low levels. Interest-
ingly defense expenditures do appear to impact on domestic savings in a manner quite 
different from that of non-defense expenditures. On the other hand, non-defense expen-
ditures may, in some instances, be a factor in retarding the mobilization of domestic 
resources. 
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